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1Overcon¯dence in Financial Markets and Consumption over the Life Cycle
Abstract
Overcon¯dence is a widely documented phenomenon. Empirical evidence reveals two
types of overcon¯dence in ¯nancial markets: investors both overestimate the average
rate of return to their assets and underestimate uncertainty associated with the return.
This paper explores implications of overcon¯dence in ¯nancial markets for consumption
over the life cycle. We obtain a closed-form solution to the time-inconsistent problem
facing an overcon¯dent investor/consumer who has a CRRA utility function. We use
this solution to show that overestimation of the mean return gives rise to a hump in
consumption during the work life if and only if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption is less than unit. We ¯nd that underestimation of uncertainty has little
e®ect on the long-run average behavior of consumption over the work life. Our calibrated
model produces a hump-shaped work-life consumption pro¯le with both the age and the
amplitude of peak consumption consistent with empirical observations.
JEL classi¯cation: D91, E21
Keywords: Overcon¯dence in ¯nancial markets; Elasticity of intertemporal substitution;
Consumption over the life cycle; Time inconsistency; Hump shape
2The chance of gain is by every man more or less overvalued, and the chance of loss
is by most men undervalued.
The over-weening conceit which the greater part of men have of their own abilities,
is an ancient evil remarked by philosophers and moralists of all ages.
|Adam Smith
1. Introduction
Humans can be overcon¯dent in self-perceptions and overrate themselves on many
positive personal traits. If John perceives he is better-looking than his classmates, he is
not alone: Motley Fool guest columnist Whitney Tilson reports that 86% of his Harvard
classmates feel they are better-looking than their peers (who is left to be worse looking?).
If John thinks he can get a better grade than his peers, he is not alone either: University
of Chicago professor Richard Thaler writes that on the ¯rst day of his class every student
expects to get an above-the-median grade (half of them are inevitably disappointed).
Overcon¯dence does not just belong to those elite school students. If you think you
are safer and more skillful than your fellow drivers, you are not alone: in Svenson's (1981)
study of Texas car drivers, 90% of those assessed believe they have above-average skills
and 82% rank themselves among the top 30% of safe drivers. Anything you think you
are better at or have better luck with than others, your peers are likely to think the same
way: 70% of lawyers in civil cases believe their sides will prevail; doctors consistently
overestimate their abilities in detecting certain diseases; parents feel their children are
smarter than others'; lottery pickers bet that tickets they choose have greater odds to
win than randomly selected ones; professional athletes and military personnel may even
be trained to be overcon¯dent and overoptimistic.
The presence of overcon¯dence in the business world is also well known. A large body
of literature documents that managers are prone to the wishful thinking that projects
they have command of are bound to succeed.1 In Copper, Woo, and Dunkelberg's (1988)
survey of nearly 3000 new business owners, 81% percent of those sampled believe their
1See Kidd and Morgan (1969), Langer (1975), Larwood and Whittaker (1977), Weinstein (1980),
Bettman and Weitz (1983), March and Shapira (1987), Russo and Schoemaker (1992), and Malmendier
and Tate (2003, forthcoming), among others.
3businesses have more than a 70% chance to succeed while 33% believe they will thrive
for sure. In actuality, 75% of new ventures do not even survive the ¯rst ¯ve years.
The phenomena of overcon¯dence and overoptimism are widespread and have long
been documented in the cognitive psychology and behavior science literature based on
data from interviews, surveys, experiments, and clinical studies. Perhaps what is more
overwhelming than the mere existence of overcon¯dence itself is the fact that the degree
of overcon¯dence is rather persistent and generally does not wane over time. In the
car-driver example, Camerer (1997) notes that even after su®ering serious car accidents,
drivers still rate themselves as above-average, and Bob Deierlein reports in a 2001 issue
of WasteAge that more experienced drivers can develop a higher degree of overcon¯dence
in their ability to avoid accidents but can in fact have accidents more frequently.
When it comes to the ¯nancial markets the phenomena of persistent overcon¯dence
and overoptimism are even more overwhelming. Empirical studies suggest that investors
persistently overestimate the average rate of return to their assets and underestimate
uncertainty associated with the return. A thesis of the present paper is that investor
overcon¯dence can be important for understanding consumption over the life cycle. Our
main ¯nding is that overestimation of the mean return can give rise to a hump-shaped
work-life consumption pro¯le, although underestimation of uncertainty can have very
little e®ect on the long-run average behavior of consumption over the work life.2
It has been a challenge to explain the life-cycle consumption behavior. The empirical
fact is that the work-life consumption pro¯le of a typical consumer is hump-shaped, with
peak consumption occurring between 45 and 55 years of age and with the ratio of peak
consumption to consumption when ¯rst entering the workforce generally above 1:1 (e.g.,
Gourinchas and Parker, 2002, Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber, 1999, Browning
and Crossley, 2001, and Feigenbaum, 2005). Such a hump-shaped work-life consumption
pro¯le is regarded as puzzling in the lens of the standard theory, which predicts that
2A number of studies show that underestimation of uncertainty associated with asset returns can
have a signi¯cant e®ect on short-run volatilities in ¯nancial markets. See De Long, Shleifer, Summers,
and Waldman (1991), Benos (1998), Odean (1998a, 1999), Statman and Thorley (19989), Gervais and
Odean (2001), Barber and Odean (2000, 2001, 2002), Hirshleifer and Luo (2001), Deaves, Luders, and
Luo (2004), Shiller (2005), Scheinkman and Xiong (2005), Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998, 2001), Hong and Stein (1999), and Englmaier (forthcoming).
4consumption should either increase (if the agent is patient) or decay (if the agent is
impatient) monotonically over the life cycle.
Several mechanisms have been proposed to meet this challenge. One assumes that
a \hand-to-mouth" agent simply consumes a constant fraction of his wage income that
is hump-shaped. Optimization-based mechanisms rely on various features to generate a
hump in the life-cycle consumption pro¯le. These features include family size dynamics,
uncertain lifetime, consumption-leisure substitutability, labor-income uncertainty, and
consumer durables.3
Our optimization-based model featuring investor overcon¯dence generates a hump
in the work-life consumption pro¯le even for a single individual, with certain lifetime,
without any tension between contemporaneous consumption-leisure substitutability or
uncertainty in labor income, and with only nondurable goods in the consumption basket.
Our calibrated model produces a hump-shaped work-life consumption pro¯le with both
the age and the amplitude of peak consumption roughly in line with the data.
Section 2 reviews some of the empirical studies that document persistent investor
overcon¯dence in ¯nancial markets along with some available explanations, in particular,
an optimal-expectations story o®ered by Brunnermeier and Parker (BP) (2005).
To isolate the e®ect of overestimation of the mean return to investment from that
of underestimation of uncertainty associated with the return on life-cycle consumption,
we consider in Section 3 a basic environment that abstracts from uncertainty where an
agent overestimates the rate of return to his asset at each age, in the spirit of BP (2005).
We obtain a closed-form solution in Section 4 to the time-inconsistent problem facing
this overcon¯dent agent who has a CRRA utility function. We use this solution to show
that the overestimation of his asset return leads to a hump in consumption during his
work life if and only if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is less
than 1. Section 5 provides some intuition behind this result. Section 6 shows that the
calibrated version of the model generates a hump-shaped work-life consumption pro¯le
3See, respectively but not exhaustively, Tobin (1967), Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985), Attanasio
and Browning (1995), Attanasio et al. (1999), Browning and Ejrnaes (2000), BÄ utler (2001); Yaari (1965),
BÄ utler (2001), Hansen and _ Imrohoro· glu (2005), Feigenbaum (2005); Heckman (1974), BÄ utler (2001),
Bullard and Feigenbaum (2005); Nagatani (1972), Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994), Carroll (1994,
1997), Gourinchas and Parker (2002); and Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (forthcoming). Browning
and Crossley (2001) provide a survey.
5where both the location and the amplitude of peak consumption are consistent with the
empirical observations.
Section 6 also extends the baseline model to an environment with uncertainty where
the actual rate of return to assets follows some stationary stochastic process. We examine
¯rst the case in which the agent has an unbiased estimation of the mean return but
underestimates uncertainty associated with the return, and then the case in which he
both overestimates the mean return and underestimates the uncertainty, as in BP (2005).
In the ¯rst case, the agent's work-life consumption pro¯le is virtually °at, with some
bumpy noise in the short run. In the second case, his work-life consumption pro¯le is
essentially the same as the one in the baseline model that abstracts from uncertainty.
We conclude that it is the overestimation of the mean return that explains the hump-
shaped work-life consumption path, while underestimation of uncertainty has very little
e®ect on the long-run average behavior of consumption over the work life.
2. Overcon¯dence in ¯nancial markets
The recent literature has documented a large body of empirical evidence on persistent
overcon¯dence in ¯nancial markets. The evidence reveals that people persistently believe
they have superior abilities in investing and good fortunes happen more often to them
than to others, while they systematically overestimate the average rate of return to their
assets and underestimate uncertainty associated with the return.4 An infamous example
is Taylor and Brown's (1988) survey which indicates that only depressed people tend to
become less overcon¯dent and more realistic, even in activities like investing. In a recent
study based on a sample of nearly 15;000 individual investors surveyed by the Gallup
Organization, Barber and Odean (2001) ¯nd that men estimate the rate of return to
their investments by nearly 3 percentage points higher than the market average return
and women by almost 2 percentage points higher. According to Daniel Houston, a senior
vice president for retirement and investor services at the Principal Financial Group Inc.,
a survey on retirement planning released in April 2005 indicates that Americans are way
too con¯dent about the future performance of their assets.
4See, among others, Presson and Benassi (1996), Odean (1998a, 1999), Barber and Odean (2002),
Chuang and Lee (2003), Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2004), Allen and Evans (2005), and Biais,
Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005).
6In another study of 78;000 individual investors, Barber and Odean (2000) also ¯nd
substantial persistence of investor overcon¯dence, which results in high trading volume
and high turnover rates in the face of repeatedly lower-than-expected realizations of asset
returns. A Gallup poll conducted in 2001 indicates that, even after an unprecedented
stock market bubble peak and subsequent burst, investors still remain overcon¯dent
and expect to beat the market return by more than 1:5 percentage points (Fisher and
Statman, 2002).5 Based on a monthly survey of 350 ¯nancial market specialists, Deaves,
Luders, and Schroder (2005) ¯nd that even professional market analysts are persistently
overcon¯dent and the degree of their overcon¯dence even increases with their longevity
(see also Atkins and Sundali, 1997, among others).
With growing empirical evidence on persistent overcon¯dence, much attention has
been paid to the question of why people are overcon¯dent and experience does not lead
them to become more realistic, especially in activities like investing where results can
be calculated ex post. Existing studies demonstrate that self-serving attribution bias
(past successes tend to exacerbate overcon¯dence as people take too much credit for
their successes, while past failures tend to be ignored as people blame their failures on
forces beyond their control), con¯rmatory bias and cognitive dissonance (tendency to
overweigh data con¯rming prior beliefs while to dismiss data contradicting prior beliefs),
illusion of control, and forces related to evolution and tournaments or contests, can all
contribute to generating persistent overcon¯dence throughout the life cycle.6 Gervais
and Odean (2001) ¯nd that, with attribution bias at work, people may even learn to
become more overcon¯dent rather than more realistic over the life cycle.
In an important analysis, Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) show that overestimation
of the mean of future income and underestimation of uncertainty associated with future
income can be the outcomes of optimization by agents who choose subjective beliefs to
maximize the average of their expected felicity over time. They provide a stereotypical
5As Shiller (2005) notes, speculative bubbles were not new and had persisted over the entire last
century, with pronounced peaks in 1901, 1929, 1966, and 2000; yet, even after serious bubbles in stock
prices have popped, investors remain persistently overcon¯dent.
6See, among others, Odean (1998a, 1998b, and the references therein) and Barber and Odean (1999).
A classic example can be found in Shefrin and Statman (1985), where investors judge their performance
by returns realized rather than returns accrued, and by holding \losers" and selling \winners" they
persistently overestimate the rate of return to their assets. See Englmaier (forthcoming) for a survey.
7scenario where optimal beliefs lead to an extremity of overcon¯dence under which future
income is always perceived as certain, even if such belief is repeatedly contradicted by
realizations. The agent merely observes one income realization at each age and believes
he was unlucky, so he continues to be overcon¯dent looking forward.
3. The basic environment
Time is continuous and begins at 0. An agent enters the workforce at t = 0, earns
wage income at rate w during his work life, retires at t = T, and passes away at t = ¹ T.
When entering the workforce the agent is endowed with an initial stock of asset S¤(0)
which, without loss of generality, is assumed to be 0. The actual law of motion for the
agent's asset position will be governed by the actual rate of return r¤ to the asset. When
making a consumption/investment plan the forward-looking agent will base his decision
on an estimated rate of return r. At each time t the agent derives utility from his actual






where ¾ is the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. The agent
has an instantaneous subjective discount rate ½.
We assume the agent is the sole member in the family, the dates of his retirement
and death are both certain, the supply of his labor during the work life is inelastic (as
he does not value leisure), the wage rate is constant during the work life, the good that
he consumes is perishable, and the actual rate of return to his asset is equal to the
discount rate. These assumptions e®ectively shut o® all the channels for generating a
hump-shaped life-cycle consumption pro¯le that are already known in the literature.
The de¯ning characteristic of our model is that the agent is overcon¯dent and he
overestimates his asset returns. Just as in the scenario described by Brunnermeier and
Parker (2005), the agent merely observes one return realization at each age and believes
he was unlucky, so he continues to be overcon¯dent or overoptimistic looking forward.
With the assumptions made in the last paragraph, investor overcon¯dence is the only
mechanism in the model that is potentially capable of producing a hump in the life-cycle
consumption pro¯le.
84. An analytical result
It turns out that whether the agent's overestimation of his asset returns can give
rise to a hump in his work-life consumption pro¯le depends on whether the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution in consumption (¾¡1) is smaller than 1, or equivalently,
whether the inverse of the elasticity (¾) is greater than 1.
Claim: Suppose the agent overestimates the rate of return to his asset so that r > r¤.
There is a hump in his consumption path during the work life if and only if the inverse
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption ¾ is greater than 1.
Because of his overcon¯dence, the dynamic optimization problem faced by the agent
is time-inconsistent. In planning his consumption and asset holding for the future, the
agent relies on an estimated rate of return to his assets. Since he overestimates the rate
of return, his consumption plan so made is not sustainable and must be revised later.
To prove the claim is to establish a connection from the planned consumption paths to
the actual consumption path. The proof takes three steps.
Step 1: Derive the planned consumption paths
At any time t0 during his work life, the agent makes a consumption/investment plan





¡½(t¡t0) U(C(t)) dt (2)
s:t: _ S(t) = rS(t) + w ¡ C(t); for t 2 [t0;T] (3)
_ S(t) = rS(t) ¡ C(t); for t 2 [T; ¹ T] (4)
S
¤(t0) given; S(¹ T) = 0 (5)
where C(t) and S(t) are the agent's planned consumption and planned asset holding
at t, and _ S(t) is the time derivative of S(t). Note that the plan is made based on the
agent's estimated rate of return to his asset r and with his actual asset position at t0,
denoted S¤(t0), taken as an initial condition.
The program de¯ned by (2)-(5) is a two-stage ¯xed-endpoint control problem with a
switch in the state equation from (3) to (4) at the agent's retirement age T. We use the
Maximum Principle for two-stage problems to solve this dynamic program. To begin,
9we de¯ne two multiplier functions, ¸1(t) for t 2 [t0;T] and ¸2(t) for t 2 [T; ¹ T], by two
laws of motion and a matching condition
_ ¸1(t) = ¡r¸1(t); for t 2 [t0;T] (6)
_ ¸2(t) = ¡r¸2(t); for t 2 [T; ¹ T] (7)
¸1(T) = ¸2(T) (8)
where (8) is a continuity or matching condition that links the two multiplier functions
at the switch point. Given (6)-(8), the solution to (2)-(5) must satisfy
e
¡½(t¡t0)C(t)
¡¾ = ¸1(t); for t 2 [t0;T] (9)
e
¡½(t¡t0)C(t)
¡¾ = ¸2(t); for t 2 [T; ¹ T]: (10)
Now, solve (6) and (7) to obtain ¸1(t) = x1e¡rt for t 2 [t0;T] and ¸2(t) = x2e¡rt for
t 2 [T; ¹ T], respectively, where x1 and x2 are constants of integration. Using (8), we show
that x1 = x2. Thus we can write the solution compactly as ¸(t) = xe¡rt for t 2 [t0; ¹ T].




¡rt; t 2 [t0; ¹ T]: (11)




¾t0; t 2 [t0; ¹ T] (12)
where y ´ x¡1=¾ and g ´ (r ¡ ½)=¾.














rt; for t 2 [t0;T] (13)
where d1 is a constant of integration. Evaluating (13) at t = t0, using the initial condition













¾t0+rtds; for t 2 [t0;T]: (14)











rt; for t 2 [T; ¹ T] (15)
10where d2 is a constant of integration. Evaluating (15) at t = ¹ T, using the terminal







¾t0+rtds; for t 2 [T; ¹ T]: (16)























e(g¡r) ¹ T ¡ e(g¡r)t0 e
gt; t 2 [t0; ¹ T]: (18)
This gives the agent's planned consumption path from the planning point t0 onward.
Step 2: Obtain the actual consumption path
We start to characterize the agent's actual consumption by noting that the agent
will actually follow his plan (18) at the initial instant t0 when the plan is made. That
is to say that his actual consumption at t0 must satisfy (18) in which t is set to t0. We
then note that t0 is just an arbitrary point in time during the agent's work life. This
suggests that the agent's actual consumption path throughout his work life must satisfy










e(g¡r) ¹ T ¡ e(g¡r)t e
gt; t 2 [0;T] (19)
where the law of motion for the agent's actual asset position S¤(t) is governed by the




¤(t) + w ¡ C
¤(t); for t 2 [0;T]: (20)
Equations (19)-(20), along with the initial condition, S¤(0) = 0, completely characterize
the agent's actual consumption and actual asset position over his work life. It follows





e(g¡r)( ¹ T¡t)C¤(t) + _ S¤(t) ¡ we¡r(T¡t)
i
e(g¡r)( ¹ T¡t) ¡ 1
: (21)
Substituting (20) into (21) yields
_ C













11Solving (19) for S¤(t) and substituting the result into (22), we obtain a ¯rst order
di®erential equation in C¤(t)
_ C
¤(t) = (g ¡ r + r
¤)C
¤(t) +






e(g¡r)( ¹ T¡t) ¡ 1
i : (23)





(g ¡ r)(r ¡ r¤)w
r
Z t 1 ¡ e¡r(T¡s)
















e(g¡r)( ¹ T¡s) ¡ 1
e
(g¡r+r¤)(t¡s)ds: (25)
Given S¤(0) = 0, (19) implies that
C
¤(0) =
(g ¡ r)w(1 ¡ e¡rT)
r
h
e(g¡r) ¹ T ¡ 1
i : (26)







e(g¡r) ¹ T ¡ 1










This gives a closed-form solution to the agent's actual consumption during the work life.
Step 3: Establish the claim





















e(g¡r) ¹ T ¡ 1
i +





e(g¡r)( ¹ T¡s) ¡ 1
e
¡(g¡r+r¤)sds: (30)
We note that C¤
1(t) is monotone increasing in t if g¡r+r¤ > 0 but monotone decreasing
in t if g ¡r+r¤ < 0: By contrast, C¤
2(t) is always monotone increasing in t since r > r¤:
Hence, if g ¡r+r¤ ¸ 0; consumption would be monotone increasing across all t 2 [0;T]
and no hump can exist. That is to say that g ¡ r + r¤ < 0 is a necessary condition for
a hump in (27). This necessary condition can be rewritten as (r ¡ ½)=¾ ¡ r + r¤ < 0:
12Since r¤ = ½; it simpli¯es to (r ¡ r¤)(1 ¡ ¾)=¾ < 0; which is equivalent to ¾ > 1 given
that ¾ is positive and r > r¤: This establishes the \only if" part of the claim.
To establish the \if" part of the claim, we can ¯rst evaluate (23) at t = 0 to get
_ C
¤(0) = (g ¡ r + r
¤)C
¤(0) +
(g ¡ r)(r ¡ r¤)w
r
1 ¡ e¡rT
e(g¡r) ¹ T ¡ 1
: (31)











g > 0; (32)
where the strict inequality holds since g > 0, as is implied by r > r¤ = ½, and g < r,
which follows if ¾ > 1: We then evaluate (23) at t = T to get
_ C
¤(T) = (g ¡ r + r
¤)C
¤(T) < 0; (33)
where the strict inequality holds since C¤(T) > 0 and g¡r+r¤ = (r ¡ ½)=¾¡r+r¤ < 0;
which is implied by r > r¤ = ½ and ¾ > 1: Thus, with the agent's overestimation of
his asset returns and a larger-than-unit inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption, at the beginning of the work life the rate of growth in his consumption
is strictly positive, while the growth rate of his consumption at the date of retirement is
strictly negative. These together imply a hump in his consumption during the working
period. This establishes the \if" part of the claim.
Our conclusion is fairly general. As long as the inverse elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption is greater than 1, a value near the lower end of empirical
estimates (e.g., Kocherlakota, 1996) and well below the values commonly used in the
life-cycle consumption literature, any degree of overestimation of asset returns will lead
to a hump in consumption during the work life.
5. Some intuition
Why does overestimation of the rate of return to assets give rise to a hump-shaped
work-life consumption pro¯le if the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
consumption is greater than unit? To help understand the intuition we need to ¯rst
understand better how the actual consumption path is related to the many planned
consumption paths obtained in solving the time-inconsistent dynamic problem.
The problem facing the agent is dynamically inconsistent due to the overestimation
of his asset returns and thus his lifetime income, which renders his consumption plan
13made at any age for the future unsustainable. When the agent ¯rst enters the workforce,
he plans to increase consumption gradually throughout his lifetime to capitalize on the
di®erence between the estimated rate of return to his assets and the discount rate, as
evident from (18). The agent will follow the plan until he observes the actual return was
lower than his estimated return for the period. While he believes he was just unlucky
and hence continues to be overcon¯dent looking forward, the agent does recognize that
the rest of his original plan has become unsustainable. He thus revises down the rest
of his old plan and makes a new plan for the remaining of his life span. Throughout
his work life, the agent continuously adjusts down his plans made in the past|each
being a monotonically increasing consumption path as evident from (18)|and replans
for the rest of his life span. This explains why his actual consumption (27) lies below his
planned consumption (18), except at the time when the plan is made, at which the two
coincide. As a solution to this time-inconsistent dynamic problem, the agent's actual
consumption constitutes the envelope of the many initial planned-values. Although the
agent's actual consumption also gradually increases through the early stage of his work
life, it does so at a lower and lower pace than each of the planned paths, as the agent
adjusts his estimated lifetime income lower and lower.
The fact that the agent's actual consumption eventually peaks and turns around
to make a hump (rather than ever increasing) has to do with the condition that the
inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption ¾ is greater than 1. To
understand this, recall that ¾ governs the curvature of the agent's utility function and
therefore a®ects his willingness to shift consumption across time. If ¾ is small, marginal
utility decreases slowly with the level of consumption and the agent is willing to capitalize
on even small di®erences between his estimated rate of return to investment and the
discount rate. If ¾ is big, marginal utility decreases rapidly with the level of consumption
and a given addition to total utility requires a large income from investment. For ¾ > 1,
the income e®ect dominates the substitution e®ect. At some point in time during his
work life, the cumulative downward adjustments in the agent's estimated lifetime income
become large enough and drive the cumulative downward adjustments in his planned
consumption paths so much that his actual consumption reaches a peak. From this
point onward, his actual consumption declines monotonically as the agent ages and
14draws nearer to the end of his work life. This gives rise to a hump in his consumption
during the working period.
6. Quantitative results
Figure 1 displays the agent's actual consumption across his work life and some of his
planned consumption paths. As is clear from the ¯gure, the actual consumption path is
the envelope of the numerous initial planned-levels of consumption. As explained above,
this envelop relationship is key to understanding why overestimation of asset returns can
lead to a hump-shaped work-life consumption pro¯le. As the ¯gure illustrates, the actual
consumption path is indeed hump-shaped, with peak consumption occurring between 45
and 55 years of age and with the ratio of peak consumption to consumption when ¯rst
entering the workforce greater than 1:1, roughly in line with the data.
In generating Figure 1, we have assumed that the agent enters the workforce at
age 25 (corresponding to the beginning point of time in the model), retires at age 65
(corresponding to T = 40), and passes away at age 80 (corresponding to ¹ T = 55). We
set the actual rate of return r¤ to 7% in light of the long-term historical average real
return in the U.S. equity market (e.g., Siegel, 1998, 1999)7. To calibrate the degree of
investor overcon¯dence, we draw on Barber and Odean (2001) who ¯nd that estimation
of asset returns by men is about 25% higher than the market average return.8 This
implies a value of r equal to 8:75%. Our result is virtually invariant to the wage rate, a
change in which shifts the work-life consumption path up or down in a parallel fashion
but a®ects neither the age of peak consumption nor the ratio of peak consumption to
consumption when ¯rst entering the workforce. In actuality, we set w to $40;000.
7Historical average real equity returns in most other industrialized countries have been about the
same as in the U.S., as standard international data from Morgan Stanley Capital International suggest.
It is the geometric average return that is referred to, and the arithmetic average return is considerably
higher (e.g., Ibbotson, 2001). We could have also used the long-term historical average real return on
U.S. Treasury bonds, which is about 3% to 3:5%. None of these choices would actually matter much for
our results as it is a just a normalization; what really matters is the degree of investor overcon¯dence,
or, by what percent the estimated return is higher than the actual return. We choose to tell our story
using the equity market as a background since this is where investor overcon¯dence is most reported.
8Barber and Odean (2001) ¯nd that men estimate their asset returns by nearly 3 percentage points
higher than the market average return that is about 12% during the period covered by the data. These
numbers are nominal. We assume this overestimation is entirely due to overestimation of the real return
rather than in°ation. This translates into a 25% lower bound on overestimation of the real return.
15Our analytical result in Section 4 shows that the inverse elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption is a key parameter, and it must be greater than 1 in order
to have a hump-shaped work-life consumption pro¯le. In generating Figure 1, we set ¾
to 3, a value close to what is commonly used in the literature, which is also the midpoint
of two recent calibrations in the life-cycle macroeconomic models (e.g., Bullard and
Feigenbaum, 2005, and Feigenbaum, 2005).
Figure 2 displays the agent's work-life consumption pro¯les normalized to the level
of his consumption when ¯rst entering the workforce under two alternative values of ¾,
2 and 4, against the one under the baseline value 3. As is clear from the ¯gure, all three
consumption paths are hump-shaped. In the benchmark case, peak consumption occurs
at 52 years of age, with the ratio of peak to initial consumption equal to 1:11. When we
lower ¾ from 3 to 2, the location of peak consumption shifts to near the upper bound
of its empirical range, to 56 years of age, while the ratio of peak to initial consumption
rises quite a bit, to 1:19. When we raise ¾ from 3 to 4, the location of peak consumption
shifts comfortably to the midpoint of its empirical range, to 50 years of age, while the
ratio of peak to initial consumption declines somewhat, to 1:07. In all of these cases,
our model explains the data fairly well.
The consumption hump in the above cases arises solely from the overestimation of
the mean return to investment, since uncertainty is deliberately abstracted away in the
attempt to isolate the e®ect of this type of investor overcon¯dence. In order to examine
the e®ect of underestimation of uncertainty on life-cycle consumption, we extend the
baseline model to an environment in which the actual return to investment follows some
stationary stochastic process. For simplicity, we assume that the actual rate of return
to the agent's asset at each point in time is a random draw from a uniform distribution
over the support [0%, 14%]. This choice of support imposes the largest volatility in
the asset returns while still maintaining the limited-liability property of the assets and
also ensuring a mean rate of return of 7% equal to the discount rate. As such, it gives
uncertainty the greatest chance to make a di®erence on the life-cycle consumption pro¯le.
We examine the case in which the agent has an unbiased estimation of the mean
return but underestimates uncertainty associated with the return, as well as the case in
which he both overestimates the mean return and underestimates the uncertainty. Just
as in Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), the agent always perceives the future return to
16his asset as certain, although this belief may repeatedly be contradicted by realizations.
With this extremity of overcon¯dence the e®ect of underestimation of uncertainty should
be most pronounced. Nevertheless, as Figure 3 reveals, the work-life consumption pro¯le
in the former case is virtually °at, with some bumpy noise in the short run. In the latter
case, as Figure 4 illustrates, the work-life consumption pro¯le is essentially the same as
the one in the baseline model without uncertainty where the agent only overestimates
the mean return. We conclude that underestimation of uncertainty plays virtually no
role in shaping the long-run average behavior of consumption over the work life, and it
is the overestimation of the mean return that accounts for the hump-shaped work-life
consumption pro¯le.
7. Concluding Remark
We have shown that overcon¯dence in ¯nancial markets can account for a de¯ning
feature of consumption over the life cycle. For the two types of investor overcon¯dence
documented in the empirical literature, we have shown that it is overestimation of the
mean return to assets rather than underestimation of uncertainty associated with the
return that can explain why the work-life consumption pro¯le is hump-shaped, a stylized
fact that is puzzling in the lens of the standard life-cycle theory. The necessary and
su±cient condition for overestimation of the mean return to generate a consumption
hump established in the paper, that is, the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption being greater than unit, has almost always been validated by empirical
estimates. Our calibrated model gives rise to a hump-shaped work-life consumption
pro¯le with both the age and the amplitude of peak consumption roughly in line with
the data. This leads us to conjecture that overcon¯dence in ¯nancial markets might have
been an important contributing factor in shaping the life-cycle consumption pro¯le.
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Planned Consumption Paths versus Actual Consumption Path
Figure 1. The actual work-life consumption path (line with stars) constitutes the
envelope of many initial planned-values of consumption









































Figure 2. The work-life consumption pro¯le normalized to the level of consumption
when ¯rst entering the workforce: Under alternatives values of ¾
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Figure 3. The work-life consumption pro¯le normalized to the level of consumption
when ¯rst entering the workforce (lower panel) under stochastic return to investment
with underestimation in volatility (upper panel)
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Figure 4. The work-life consumption pro¯le normalized to the level of consumption
when ¯rst entering the workforce (lower panel) under stochastic return to investment
with overestimation in the mean return and underestimation in volatility (upper panel)
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